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Abstract: 
 
This study investigates entrepreneurs’ judgment and decision-making when faced with decision 
anomalies in the context of mental accounting and the framing effect. Both contexts can pave the 
way for the evaluation of entrepreneurs’ judgment and decisions in terms of anomalous 
situations and comparison with nonentrepreneurial judgment and decision-making. This study 
aims to identify the behavior of entrepreneurs in two distinct studies. Study 1 shows that mental 
accounting bias has little impact on entrepreneurs' judgment. Specifically, the effects of 
cognitive bias, task framing, endowment, and the integration of information did not affect 
entrepreneurs' decision-making. However, cognitive biases of sunk cost and extra-cost 
influenced entrepreneurs’ judgments. In Study 2, data on the framing effect comparing 
inexperienced and experienced entrepreneurs' decisions using an online survey reveal that 
experienced entrepreneurs’ judgments were less affected by the framing effect while 
inexperienced entrepreneurs were more biased toward loss aversion. 
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Article: 
 
Introduction 
 
The trait approach identifies locus of internal control, risk-taking, need for achievement, 
tolerance of ambiguity, and over-confidence as characteristics of entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs 
use intuition and lean more toward cognitive biases in their decisions than managers (Busenitz 
and Barney 1997). The trait approach focuses on the extent to which factors influence the 
judgment and decision-making process in entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurs are faced with risk 
and uncertainty on a daily basis, so dealing with certain tasks only covers a small portion of their 
activities (Abatecola, Caputo, and Cristofaro 2018; Ramadani et al. 2017). Kirzner (1979) 
introduces the pure entrepreneur, for whom decision-making is one of the most important tasks. 
Casson (1982) and Palmer (1971) consider entrepreneurs skilled decision-makers. Good 
judgment is an essential part of the process of finding opportunities under conditions of 
uncertainty (Foss and Klein 2012). 
 
Mental accounting and the framing effect influence individuals' judgments and decision-making 
unconsciously (Emami et al. 2011; Kahneman 2003). These anomalies create biases that 
challenge individuals’ thought processes. The main issue in decision anomalies is that decision-
making can be a function of sunk and trivial issues related to the decision itself. For example, 
when decision-making and selection is a function of the frame and form of a question, the 
presentation can lead to bias in judgment and decision-making, as well as unstable and 
unadaptable behaviors (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1991). 
 
Research exploring entrepreneurs’ judgments, decision-making, and decision anomalies often 
focuses on biases. For example, Burmeister and Schade (2007) examine the status quo bias 
among entrepreneurs. Studies that emphasize several cognitive biases do not often identify 
decision-making patterns. Therefore, our study examines entrepreneurs’ judgments and decision-
making using mental accounting anomalies and the framing effect through a survey research 
method in two studies. Study 1 compares entrepreneurs’ and nonentrepreneurs’ judgments using 
mental accounting. The findings show that the impact of a mental accounting bias on 
entrepreneurs’ decision-making is low. The effects of cognitive bias, including framing task, 
endowment effect, and the integration and segregation of information, do not influence 
entrepreneurs’ decision-making, though this is not the case for nonentrepreneurs. The results also 
reveal that entrepreneurs’ cognitive biases of sunk cost and extra-cost effects influence their 
judgments. Cognitive biases in mental accounting by others do not influence entrepreneurial 
analytical thinking under conditions of uncertainty. To better understand entrepreneurs' judgment 
processes, Study 2 adds an experience factor and compares the judgment of experienced and 
inexperienced entrepreneurs with students using risk framing. The results show that experienced 
entrepreneurs show few tendencies toward framing effects while inexperienced entrepreneurs are 
more biased toward loss aversion. In addition, experienced entrepreneurs approach the decision 
problem differently, and their experience and alertness enable them to analyze the framing 
effects. 
 
The structure of this article is as follows: We begin with a review of the literature on 
entrepreneurship, mental accounting, and the framing effect. Next, we present the methodology, 
results, and discussion. We conclude with implications for practice and directions for further 
research. 
 
Mental accounting and the framing effect 
 
The study of decision-making entails two major approaches: normative and descriptive. The 
normative approach pertains to rationality and logic. Normative models promote better judgment 
and decision-making. To this end, there is a need for certain criteria to evaluate and collect data 
on judgments, identify what makes them better or worse, and test methods for improving them 
when there is a possibility for improvement (Baron 2006). In terms of behavioral decision-
making, this approach is the more dominant but also has some contradictions. For example, 
entrepreneurial opportunities that lend themselves to profitable situations are highly 
indeterminable because of uncertainty. Therefore, not all profitable situations in entrepreneurship 
can be deemed opportunities, unless the entrepreneur, through a course of purposeful actions, 
concludes that they are and, in doing so, reduces uncertainty. 
 
The descriptive approach pertains to people's beliefs, purposes, and preferences (priorities) as 
they are and not as they should be. The real goals and preferences of individuals in their 
entrepreneurial journey are among the most important concerns of research on entrepreneurial 
action and value creation (eg Dimov 2018). According to Tversky and Kahneman (1981), 
prospect theory best explains contradictions in decision-making. A rational individual, as defined 
in the social sciences and economics, is someone who seeks to maximize his or her utility. For 
example, if a is less than b and b is less than c, he or she will assume that a is less than c and 
that c has a higher value. At any time and situation, this person will believe in this inequality, 
which is called the “invariance rule.” Entrepreneurs as decision-makers do not always take the 
most desirable option. This is when decision anomalies come into play—when a person makes 
unique decisions or takes distinctive actions in a business situation (eg an entrepreneur decides to 
start a business) that others might question (eg necessity, success probability). One possible 
factor is entrepreneurs' mental model, which shapes a given business decision (ie a frame that 
constitutes an entrepreneur's judgments and convinces him or her that this is an opportunity but 
seems a strange and unexpected step to others). 
 
According to Tversky and Kahneman (1981), judgments and decision-making can be affected by 
the extent to which decision outcomes undergo manipulation. One of the most notable and much-
disputed issues is “framing,” which strays from rational decision theory (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1986). Rational decision-making models are based on the normative model of 
expected-utility theory (Baron 2008). Thus, decision outcomes need to conform to the principle 
of description invariance (Kahneman and Tversky 1984). This principle maintains that an 
individual’s choices should not change because of how a decision scenario is manipulated in 
different conditions or situations. Nevertheless, even contradictory choices could be framed 
through different manipulations of a decision problem. This is because framing of the problem 
may objectively highlight part of the information, directing an individual’s decision to a choice 
that may not be rational but based on subjective values. 
 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) introduced risk framing, which challenges an individual’s 
judgment by way of two sets of risky versus certain options with identical expected values in 
positive and negative manipulations. This classic framing is the most widely used in research 
(Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth 1998). According to Tversky and Kahneman (1981), individuals 
tend to prefer risk-averse alternatives when the outcomes are framed in term of gains (eg saving 
lives, making money), but shift to preferring risk-taking when the equivalent outcomes are 
framed in terms of losses (eg dying, losing money). For example, in a risk assessment test, 
participants were asked to choose between two options; the options were presented by different 
plans and the maximum income was $3000. In Plan 1, if participants accept option A, they have 
a 50% possibility of gaining $3000, but there is also a 50% chance of not losing any money. In 
option B, participants gain $1500 without participating in the test. In Plan 2, if participants 
accept option A, there is a 50% possibility of losing $3000, but there is also a 50% chance of not 
losing any money. In option B, participants will lose $1500 without participating in the test 
(Soman 2004). 
 
Plan 2 is similar to Plan 1 in its outcome, except that in Plan 1, information is framed in the form 
of a gain and reaping a profit, while the opposite occurs in Plan 2. In this experiment, the results 
showed that in Plan A, 35% of participants chose Option A and 65% chose Option B. In Plan B, 
72% chose Option A and 28% chose Option B. This discrepancy is deemed irrational because it 
contradicts the invariance rule. Therefore, in this case the problem designer has been able to 
create contradictory choices by manipulating the problem. In the decision-making literature in 
behavioral sciences, this manipulation is referred to as the framing effect, and when these effects 
are used to manipulate the frame of issues related to financial and economic profits, the effects of 
mental accounting arise. 
 
Cognitive biases in mental accounting 
 
In prospect theory, loss aversion is an individual’s tendency to grant more weight to losses, that 
is, “the attractiveness derived from the possible gain is not high enough to compensate for the 
aversion of the possible loss” (Soman 2004, 387). For example, losing $1000 will cause more 
dissatisfaction and annoyance to an individual than earning $1000. The influence of this 
cognitive bias on triggering other decision anomalies is significant. We focus on the most 
important and widely used decision anomalies next. 
 
Task framing 
 
Positive features of an option or multiple options provide good reasons for choosing. Therefore, 
in their mental models, people are likely to give more weight to a certain option. The negative 
features of the same option also provide a good reason to reject it. Therefore, they give more 
weight to that option when rejecting it (Soman 2004). According to this bias, individuals tend to 
choose an option that has the highest positive value and to reject an option with the most 
negative information over a moderate option. This principle has implications for anticipating 
people's ideas and predicting consumer behavior in marketing issues. 
 
Endowment effect 
 
Typically, people have little desire to give up what they already own, even though they gain an 
advantage in return. In other words, the utility of keeping a default state of mind seems to be 
greater than the utility of leaving it. As such, the loss of owned things tends to seem greater and 
more annoying than later profits (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1991). The rigidity of sales 
can help explain the use of the endowment effect in the market. This cognitive bias will reduce 
the number of sales in the market because it creates a special condition in which people are not 
willing to easily relinquish what they own (price x) and will not pay the price of x when they are 
not the owner. This prejudice to the current situation negates buying and selling (Gourville and 
Soman 2002). 
 
Sunk cost effect 
 
When faced with the issue of financial decision-making, a person may create a mental model 
called the “mental account.” A mental account will not be resolved until it has the expected 
value, which is referred to as the "sunk cost" effect. For example, when a person buys a ticket for 
a football game and the expected value of watching the game is not fulfilled at the stadium, that 
person will experience mental stress. His or her passion for football encourages him or her to 
watch the game, not the obligation, even if the weather conditions are not favorable and he or she 
could be watching the game on television instead. However, the cost that has already been paid 
(the ticket) and the account created in mind force this person to attend the game. The formulation 
of this effect, which results from the cost paid before the service is received, is called the “sunk 
cost effect” (Cheema and Soman 2003). Individuals show commitment to the cost they have 
already paid and try to avoid wasting it. In many cases, this bias is a waste of resources and 
opportunities. When bias is at work, people base their decisions on past events rather than 
focusing realistically on the outcomes (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1991). 
 
Extra-cost effect 
 
The effect of an imposed cost or extra cost is the result of an intuitive process in which 
individuals compare the mental value with the total cost. In this perceptual error, individuals 
refer to the record of an expense; if it is related to a mental account, which has not yet turned into 
a profit, the individual will view paying the extra cost as an imposition. However, if the benefit is 
already gained or does not relate to a previous mental account, this new amount will create a new 
independent account (Gourville and Soman 2002; Soman 2004). 
 
Influence of information integration and segregation 
 
When the decision information is integrated, the effect of avoiding loss is reduced. For example, 
Cheema and Soman (2003) presented recreational packages to participants in an integrated and 
segregated way and asked them to express their opinions on the attractiveness of each one. In the 
first plan, the price of the services provided in the recreational package was presented as a total 
(eg a flight ticket, accommodations, and a driver for a total price of $2000). In the other plan, 
each service was priced separately (eg flight ticket $500, accommodations $1400, and a driver 
$100, totaling $2000). The authors found that participants rated the first recreational package as 
more attractive. According to Thaler (1999), people integrate or segregate the (negative or 
positive) outcomes of a single option. In the integration of outcomes, they combine them before 
using the value function and consider them part of the same mental account. However, when 
segregating different outcomes, they use the value function for each of the losses or wins, which 
makes their decisions irrelevant. 
 
Opportunity cost in mental accounting 
 
Economists and accountants use the term “opportunity cost” to indirectly describe a phenomenon 
in mental accounting. Opportunity cost is an advantage gained from abandoning an action 
associated with the default situation (Frederick et al. 2009). For example, assume that an 
individual is considering buying a vehicle from a dealer offering a low-profit loan. When that 
individual has enough money for the car (ie the default situation), he or she may withdraw the 
request for the loan and think "Why should I pay interest when I have enough money?" He or she 
must also take into account that the money not spent on a car could be invested elsewhere for a 
profit. Therefore, if the return on investment is higher than the interest rate on the car loan, the 
buyer should take out the car loan. In such decision situations, it is better to focus on the 
difference between options than on the profit or loss associated with the deal so as not to miss the 
opportunity and pay an extra opportunity cost (Thaler 1999). 
 
Cognitive intuition 
 
Cognitive intuition and bias may help explain entrepreneurial risky behaviors and perceived 
entrepreneurial risk-taking. In addition to the significance of cognitive intuition, research in the 
field of decision-making psychology highlights the importance and framing effect of situations 
on the risky behaviors of entrepreneurs and managers. For example, Burmeister and Schade 
(2007) compared the effect of the cognitive "status quo bias" on the decisions of entrepreneurs, 
students, and bank employees. They found that entrepreneurs were affected by this cognitive bias 
as much as students, but the effect was less than with bank employees. They likened the 
experience of entrepreneurs to a double-edged sword as justification for the phenomenon. On the 
one hand, the experience of knowledge and awareness necessitates a less-error-prone decision; it 
preserves the status quo bias. On the other hand, their findings did not confirm the bias of 
entrepreneurial decisions to the status quo bias. 
 
Forbes (2005) shows that entrepreneurs use intuition and cognitive bias to deal with or react to 
specific environmental conditions associated with shaping venture capital. In their research on 
decision-making between managers and entrepreneurs, Busenitz and Barney (1997) found that 
the use of intuition by entrepreneurs can lead to acceptable solutions that are effective and 
efficient. Barbosa and Fayolle (2007) examine how changes in available information in relation 
to the creation of venture capital affect the perception of entrepreneurial risk associated with the 
framing effect and ultimately lead to launching a venture. They tested the cognitive bias of 
availability and anchoring information in entrepreneurs' risk decision-making processes and 
argued that the anchoring information in hierarchical events, defined as a series of incidental 
events, can result in entrepreneurs giving excessive weight to business success and, thus, error in 
the decision-making process. In non-hierarchical events (independent events), entrepreneurs give 
little weight to the potential failure of a venture, which also threatens the survival of a business. 
Therefore, cognitive intuition and framing issues are not independent of each other. Framing 
may lead individuals to have an anchoring information bias, thus influencing their perceptions of 
entrepreneurial risk. 
 
Emami (2017) examines how different framings of entrepreneurial opportunity can influence the 
risk preference of entrepreneurs and nonentrepreneurs and whether this differs between men and 
women at the time of opportunity evaluation. He found that the framing of the situation as 
positive or negative significantly affected an individual’s judgment of entrepreneurial 
opportunities. Negative frames have stronger effects, causing more inconsistencies in judgment 
and leading individuals to choose riskier options. Moreover, Emami concludes that male and 
female entrepreneurs have more risk dispositions in situations in which there is consistency 
between the topic of the problem and the individual’s role. For this reason, entrepreneurs show 
more risk-taking behavior than nonentrepreneurs in their endeavors. 
 
Research on decision-making, environmental uncertainty, and complexity labels decision-
making as one of the most important factors leading entrepreneurs to use intuition and avoid 
formal and logical decision-making models (Busenitz and Barney 1997). In general, 
entrepreneurs face more uncertainty in decision-making than other groups. Entrepreneurs often 
make decisions with little or no history, no specific levels of performance, and a low amount of 
market information (Kreiser and Davis 2010). 
 
Study 1 
 
Sample 
 
The sample population included only male entrepreneurs and nonentrepreneurs of the Tehran 
province across different industries. We followed Emami’s (2017) sampling method to determine 
our sample of entrepreneurs and nonentrepreneurs. The list of entrepreneurs (approximately 350) 
came from Tehran's science and technology parks and the Iranian Ministry of Cooperatives, 
Labor, and Social Welfare of the Tehran Province.1 Next, we used Nicolaou et al.’s (2009) 5-
scale Opportunity Recognition Index to determine the final sample of entrepreneurs. According 
to experts’ recommendations (a group of experts consisted of three entrepreneurship professors 
and a psychometrician), the minimum required score to be identified as an entrepreneur was 17 
out of 25 points. Only 106 male entrepreneurs with scores above this point (>17) were obtained 
and extracted from the list (ie 350) for the final step; however, of these, only 60 either took part 
in the survey or had usable questionnaires. 
 
The nonentrepreneurs were those who demonstrated little tendency toward venture activities. 
This criterion was fulfilled from data collected from staff employees (other than those in 
managerial positions) of seven large governmental organizations located in Tehran. We compiled 
a list of randomly selected email contacts of 414 individuals from these organizations. We 
contacted all of them and asked them to answer the research questionnaire, though only 71 
responded to the survey. To ensure proper selection of the nonentrepreneurs, we compared the 
total scores of entrepreneurs and nonentrepreneurs. The sixty entrepreneurs had a total score of 
1140. As the research sample size is based on the number of entrepreneurs (for the better 
generalization of the results; Emami 2017), we also set the number of nonentrepreneurs to be the 
same. To this end, we considered the least calculated score in the rankings for the first 
nonentrepreneur and this went on up to the 60th nonentrepreneur. 
 
Analysis 
 
We adapted the scenarios used in this study from the validated work of Kahneman, Knetsch, and 
Thaler (1991) and Soman (2004). These scenarios were presented as multiple choices or 
narrations. The topics used in the questionnaire are a combination of general and entrepreneurial 
                                                          
1 Tehran, which is the capital city of Iran, is a primary region for emergence and growth of start-ups. Moreover, 
most established firms distributed throughout the country have their headquarters in Tehran. Traditionally, the 
government allocates more resources (eg, tax discounts, low rents, access to facilities and training) to this region of 
the country for entrepreneurial activities. For this reason, knowledge-incentive firms are more often based in Tehran 
than in other provinces. Therefore, almost all research on entrepreneurship in Iran collects data primarily from 
Tehran entrepreneurship centers (eg, accelerators, science and technology parks, incubators). 
issues (see the Appendix). The dependent variable is judgment and decision-making of 
entrepreneurs and nonentrepreneurs when confronted with mental accounting issues. We used a 
one-sample t-test, two-samples t-test, Mann–Whitney U test, Cramer’s Vcoefficient, and cross-
tabulations in the inferential statistics section to compare the decisions of entrepreneurs and 
nonentrepreneurs. This study has six research questions as follows: (1) What is the difference 
between decisions by entrepreneurs and others in terms of task framing? (2) Does the 
endowment effect lead to different decision-making by entrepreneurs and others? (3) Does the 
sunk cost effect make a difference in mental accounting between entrepreneurs and others? (4) 
Does the extra-cost effect make a difference between decisions by entrepreneurs and others? (5) 
Does the integration and segregation of information make a difference between decisions by 
entrepreneurs and others? and (6) Do entrepreneurs identify the opportunity cost better than 
others? 
 
Results 
 
The evaluation tool for this cognitive bias was designed to include two business options. We 
placed the positive and negative features in Business Option A, while Option B included the 
moderated version of all the positive and negative features. For the first question, most 
entrepreneurs (70%) chose Option A. When they were asked which options they rejected, 68% 
chose Option B. Thus, the respondents were not affected by task framing, because the 
undesirable features of Option A did not make them choose Option A. The Mann–Whitney test 
(U-test) also shows this difference with 95% level of confidence (N = 58, U = 261, Sig. < 0.01). 
Conversely, when nonentrepreneurs were asked which options they preferred, they chose Option 
A (57%), and when they were asked which options they would have rejected, again they chose A 
(69%). The Mann–Whitney test also shows this at a 95% level of confidence (N = 59, U = 381.5, 
Sig. > 0.05). Therefore, in contrast with nonentrepreneurial decision-making, mental accounting 
does not influence entrepreneurial decision-making. 
 
For the second question, we assessed the endowment effect with a question related to the sale of 
a rug. A one-sample t-test shows that the entrepreneurs were indifferent to selling or not selling 
the rug (N = 56, t = 0.564, μ = 4.2, sig. > 0.05) while nonentrepreneurs were reluctant to sell the 
rug (N = 59, t = –2.5, μ = 3.23, Sig. < 0.05). These results based on a two-samples t-test show a 
significant difference (95% confidence level) between the decisions of the entrepreneurs and the 
nonentrepreneurs (N = 59, f = 0.001, Sig. < 0.05). Therefore, the endowment effect of the 
proposed framing question is weak for both entrepreneurs and nonentrepreneurs. 
 
For the third question, we evaluated the bias in the sunk cost effect with two questions. The first 
question asked about an inefficient product upgrade project, and insistence on the continuation of 
the project would indicate the bias. The second question involved the selling of shares, in which 
selling of a friend's share reflected a sunk cost bias. The results of a two-samples t-test for the 
first question reveal a significant difference between the decision of entrepreneurs and 
nonentrepreneurs, with 95% probability (N = 59, f = 3.8, Sig. < 0.01). A one-sample t-test shows 
that entrepreneurs were insisting on continuing the project (N = 57, t =2.5, μ = 4.9, Sig. < 0.01) 
while nonentrepreneurs did not insist on continuing it (N = 59, t = 25.1, μ = 3.6, Sig. > 0.05). 
These results indicate that although the product upgrade project is an inefficient project, sunk 
cost has no effect on nonentrepreneurial decision-making while it affects entrepreneurial 
decision-making. 
 
For this third question, although we find a difference between the responses of entrepreneurs and 
nonentrepreneurs (N = 117, U = 951, p < 0.05), the results are unclear. This is because the 
distribution of responses is scattered and there is a 10% difference between the "no difference" 
and "friend's share" response (Table 1). Nonentrepreneurs chose “friend’s share” as much as 
their own share. Therefore, this bias does not affect either group. 
 
Table 1. The effect of sunk cost for the second question. 
  Your share (%) Friend’s share (%) No difference (%) Total value (%) 
Entrepreneurs 20.7 34.5 44.8 100 
Nonentrepreneurs 44.1 50.8 5.1 100 
 
In the fourth question, we measured the extra-cost effect with a question about watching a show 
in a theater. For the entrepreneurs, a one-sample t-test shows a significant difference in means (N 
= 30, t = 6.38, μ = 6.2, Sig. < 0.01) versus (N = 27, t = 0.359, μ = 4.1, Sig. < 0.05). Therefore, 
depending on how the problem was presented (negative vs. positive), we obtained different 
means. In addition, a two-samples t-test shows the difference (N = 57, F = 4.4, Sig. < 0.01). The 
results are the same for nonentrepreneurs. In a one-sample t-test (N = 29, t = –2.46, μ = 2.9, Sig. 
< 0.05) versus (N = 30, t = 0.836, μ = 4.3, Sig. < 0.05), and in a two-samples t-test (N = 59, F = 
0.03, Sig. < 0.05). Therefore, in the case of two questions having the same outcome, both 
entrepreneurs and nonentrepreneurs make conflicting decisions which approve the influence of 
the extra-cost effect on their decisions. 
 
For the fifth question regarding integration and segregation, the option included buying a jacket 
and a calculator in two distinct ways with the same outcome. In this question, we did not observe 
the bias among entrepreneurs. In both plans posed by the problem, the entrepreneurs had little 
desire to buy a calculator, and they were almost as willing to drive to another store to buy the 
calculator (N = 30, t = 3.27, μ = 2.8, Sig. < 0.01) as to buy the higher-priced option in the mall 
(N = 29, t = –3.47 μ = 2.8, Sig. < 0.01). A two-samples t-test shows that there is no difference 
between the responses of entrepreneurs (N = 59, F = 0.6, Sig. < 0.05). By contrast, the framing 
effect on nonentrepreneurs is clear (N = 30, t = 0.63, μ = 4.2, Sig. < 0.05) versus (N = 29, t = –
2.74, μ = 2.8, Sig. < 0.05). A two-samples t-test rejects the mean equality of the response with 
95% confidence (N = 59, F = 2.08, Sig. < 0.05). 
 
The sixth question asked whether the respondents would ignore an opportunity when it was 
clouded by the framing effect of cost. We tested the effect in the selection of Product A and 
Product B: the selection of Product B for production would indicate that the opportunity cost 
clouded the choice. Most of the entrepreneurs chose Product A, so the framing effect did not lead 
to missed opportunity despite the hidden cost. However, the nonentrepreneurs ignored the 
opportunity. Sixty-six percent of the entrepreneurs chose Product A, and 71% of 
nonentrepreneurs chose Product B. The hypothesis test results also reject the equality of 
responses between entrepreneurs and nonentrepreneurs (N = 118, U = 1091.5, Sig. < 0.01). 
 
Discussion 
 
We used six questions, each containing one mental accounting anomaly, to compare the 
judgments and decisions of entrepreneurs and nonentrepreneurs. For the first question, we could 
not confirm the effect of task framing on decision-making among entrepreneurs, while it was 
effective among nonentrepreneurs. The lack of a task framing effect in entrepreneurs’ decision-
making proves their analytical characteristic. This cognitive capability enables entrepreneurs to 
consider other aspects of issues before making decisions. 
 
In the second question, we confirmed the weakness of the endowment effect on decision-making 
among entrepreneurs, while the effect was effective for nonentrepreneurs. The weak endowment 
effect in entrepreneurial decision-making is a desirable characteristic. The literature review 
indicates a positive relationship between sales clerks’ long experience in the market and low 
effectiveness. This feature helps increase profits for entrepreneurs because they have little bias 
toward maintaining their product and prefer to ensure their success in the long run by increasing 
sales and remaining in the market. 
 
We examined the effect of sunk cost in the third question and observed this cognitive bias in the 
decision-making of entrepreneurs. The effect of sunk cost on mental value is usually undesirable, 
and it has an adverse effect in entrepreneurship. Bias toward a specific task blocks the means to 
achieve other options. This is opposite the tendency to innovate that Schumpeter (1934) sets as 
the centerpiece of his definition of entrepreneurship (see Begley and Boyd 1987; Cheah 1990). 
While this conclusion does not question Schumpeter definition of an entrepreneur, it may be a 
caveat for entrepreneurs in accomplishing their business tasks. In particular, they should avoid 
bias toward a solution and always consider other aspects and possible solutions even when 
implementing their ideas and strategies. 
 
We confirmed the extra-cost effect for both entrepreneurs and nonentrepreneurs in the fourth 
question. Answers to this question indicated that when entrepreneurs intend to do something, 
they persist to a greater degree than nonentrepreneurs. This persistence can be both negative and 
positive and is consistent with the findings of the sunk cost for entrepreneurs. On the negative 
side, persistence brings about the extra-cost effect which is a barrier to innovation. On the 
positive side, it shows determination, commitment, and diligence on the part of entrepreneurs 
after deciding to achieve a goal. 
 
The results of the fifth question show that integration and segregation of information fail to 
create bias in decisions among entrepreneurs. However, we observed bias in nonentrepreneurial 
decision-making. In general, information integration is a means to increase sales through 
promotion. Therefore, the finding that entrepreneurs’ decision-making was not influenced is 
indicative of their awareness of the deception inherent in the question. 
 
Finally, in the sixth question, we examined a problem related to opportunity cost through the 
framing effect. In contrast with nonentrepreneurs, entrepreneurs were able to identify the 
opportunity cost and make a more optimal decision. 
 
Study 2 
 
Sample 
 
Study 2 consisted of an Internet-based survey sent to 581 adults (214 students, 185 inexperienced 
entrepreneurs, and 182 experienced entrepreneurs). The students were all undergraduates mainly 
studying science at the University of Tehran. They ranged in age from 18 to 28 years, with a 
mean of 20.6 years (SD = 3.7). Both groups of entrepreneurs came from different industries, and 
their firms were located in the science and technology parks in Iran (8 of 16 parks in the 
country). They ranged from 22 to 67 years of age, with a mean of 31.4 years (SD = 8.9). 
 
We used the "risky-choice framing" section of Huang and Wang’s (2010) questionnaire for this 
study. The respondents were randomly assigned to three different task domains (ie life/death, 
investment, and time task domains). We chose these three domains for our experiment tool to 
address a common human issue (ie life/death), a business matter that entrepreneurs generally 
deal with often (ie money/investment), and an educational dilemma that students commonly 
confront (ie time for university projects). To compare the three cohorts, we used the sum of 
responses for all three task domains rather than testing differences within each domain. Then, 
respondents were randomly assigned to either a positive frame or a negative frame (Huang and 
Wang 2010). All three groups of respondents were randomly assigned to the three task domains 
(see Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Sample sizes for each subgroup after random assignments. 
Task domains Experienced entrepreneurs Inexperienced entrepreneurs Student 
Life-death 
 Positive 35 30 37 
 Negative 28 33 31 
Investment 
 Positive 36 33 30 
 Negative 26 36 42 
Time 
 Positive 20 28 41 
 Negative 37 25 33 
 
Inexperienced entrepreneurs are those in the start-up period with no past business experience, 
while experienced entrepreneurs are those who had an established business for at least five years 
with a minimum of 8–15 employees (Hornaday and Aboud 1971; Hornaday and Bunker 1970). 
The risky-choice framing was included in each domain, and respondents were randomly assigned 
to either a positive or a negative frame. The survey consisted of double-choice questions. 
 
Analysis 
 
We used descriptive statistics (mean, frequency, and cross-tabulation) and a nonparametric test 
(Kruskal–Wallis H) to analyze the differences between the groups. As noted, the study was a 3 
(groups: experienced [coded 1] vs. inexperienced [coded 2] vs. student [coded 3]) × 2 (options: 
positive vs. negative) × 2 (domain: risky vs. certain) design. Therefore, this study has a main 
research question as follows: Does entrepreneurial experience influence individuals’ decisions in 
view of the risk framing effect of life/death, investment, and time task domains? We applied the 
results of Tversky and Kahneman's (1981) Asian disease problem for comparison. 
 
Results 
 
The abbreviations PR and PC in the study refer to risky and certain options in the positive form, 
and NR and NC mean risky and certain option in the negative form, respectively. Tversky and 
Kahneman's (1981) original Asian disease framing problem showed a difference between PR and 
NR of approximately 50% (78%–28%) and a difference between PC and NC of 50% (72%–
22%). Greater proximity to these numbers means higher framing effects. Table 3provides the 
primary results. 
 
Table 3. The response rate of all groups in the risk framing effect of life/death, investment, and 
time task domains. 
  Experienced entrepreneurs (%) Inexperienced entrepreneurs (%) Students (%) 
Positive 
 Risky(PR) 51 47 30 
 Certain(PC) 49 53 70 
Negative 
 Risky(NR) 60 80 76 
 Certain(PC) 40 20 24 
 
The results show that students are more prone to framing effects in all three domains (life/death, 
money, and time) than inexperienced and experienced entrepreneurs (see Table 2). In addition, 
the results of the Kruskal–Wallis test show a significant difference between negative and positive 
framing among entrepreneurs and students (for all groups, positive χ2(2, N = 290) = 9.78, p < 
0.01; for all groups, negative χ2(2, N = 291) = 9.92, p < 0.01). 
 
Although the framing effect is noticeable among the three groups, experienced entrepreneurs 
have fewer tendencies toward framing in all domains. The inexperienced entrepreneurs have 
more tendencies toward negative than positive framing. As Table 2 shows, the mean difference 
between PR–NR and PC–NC in the student group is 46%; this was 33% and 9% for 
inexperienced and experienced entrepreneurs, respectively. These results reveal that 
inexperienced entrepreneurs have less tendency toward the framing effect than students while 
experienced entrepreneurs have the least tendency toward the framing effect among the groups. 
 
Table 4. The percentage of responses within each group. 
  NR (%) NC (%) Sum (%) PR (%) PC (%) Sum (%) 
Experienced entrepreneurs 49 51 100 40 60 100 
Inexperienced entrepreneurs 53 47 100 20 80 100 
Students 70 30 100 24 76 100 
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) Asian disease 72 28 100 22 78 100 
Note: Each portion consists of average response rates of all three task domains of life-death, time, and investment 
within each group. 
 
In the negative framing condition, we find no significant difference between inexperienced 
entrepreneurs and students (χ2(1, N = 200) = 0.328, p > 0.05) but a significant difference 
between experienced entrepreneurs and inexperienced entrepreneurs and students (χ2(1, N = 185) 
= 8.24, p < 0.01). In the positive framing condition, we find no significant difference between 
inexperienced entrepreneurs and students (χ2(1, N = 182) = 0.547, p > 0.05) but a significant 
difference between students and both groups of entrepreneurs (χ2 (1, N = 199) = 9.88, p < 0.01). 
This suggests that entrepreneurs are more risk-takers than the other groups. Therefore, in the 
positive manipulation, entrepreneurs have less tendency to choose certain options than students; 
however, PC is still greater than PR (see Table 4). In general, inexperienced entrepreneurs are 
more risk-taking in the negative framing than experienced entrepreneurs. In addition, 
experienced entrepreneurs' risk-taking behavior is more moderate. Thus, the framing effect is 
greater among inexperienced than experienced entrepreneurs. 
 
Several studies have introduced risk-taking as a characteristic of entrepreneurs (Brockhaus 1980; 
McClelland 1961). Entrepreneurs are more open to risk-taking at the preliminary stages of 
setting up a business. This issue may have amplified risk-taking by inexperienced entrepreneurs 
in NR. Other studies have found that entrepreneurs have a moderate propensity for risk 
(Timmons 1978; Welsh and White 1981), and this may partly explain the results obtained for 
experienced entrepreneurs in NR. 
 
Discussion 
 
Studies in framing show that analytical individuals have fewer tendencies toward framing effects 
than holistic individuals (Leboeuf and Shafir 2003; McElroy and Seta 2003). Entrepreneurs are 
more likely to identify the differences between unsatisfied needs, which helps them recognize 
opportunities. Over time, experienced entrepreneurs learn how to improve their analytical 
reasoning to imagine other states simultaneously when confronted with an unsatisfied need in the 
market (eg identifying an unsatisfied need is a negative state that other individuals often neglect 
or do not pay attention to). In the current study, this is evidenced by the group of experienced 
entrepreneurs that behaved more consistency in following their course of action. 
 
According to the Australian School, entrepreneurship is rooted in asymmetry in entrepreneurial 
knowledge and information that others have not yet understood and exploited. This knowledge in 
turn leads to the discovery of available beneficial differences and gaps and opportunity 
discovery. Considering the discovered opportunity, entrepreneurs invest in this knowledge to 
achieve a profit (Foss and Klein 2012; Knight 1921). 
 
Consciousness and analyses make spontaneous learning more effective for successful 
entrepreneurs. The level of consciousness is different from one person to another. Even if two 
individuals have the same level of experience, they may not achieve the same result because the 
nature of learning is different for each (Kirzner 1979). Kirzner (1979) cites learning from prior 
mistakes and considers experience a teacher for entrepreneurs. He views learning as a non-
conscious process that leads to the discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities. By contrast, 
continued entrepreneurial activity leads to increased knowledge about situations, thus reducing 
the level of uncertainty over time and enhancing market processes (Cheah 1990). Therefore, with 
increased experience over time, entrepreneurs are likely to perceive less uncertainty or be less 
affected by the framing of issues in the business world. As such, it is not surprising that 
experienced entrepreneurs have a different perception of framing issues than inexperienced 
entrepreneurs. 
 
One reason entrepreneurs are more risk-taking than others is their optimism (Anderson and 
Galinsky 2006). Their higher self-confidence enables them to perceive a high probability of 
success (Lichtenstein and Fischhoff 1977). Entrepreneurs’ propensity toward PR is largely due to 
their risk-taking (Emami 2017). Entrepreneurs with experience have a stronger sense of power 
and control over situations, which allows them to be less concerned about possible negative 
outcomes. As a result, they can choose risky options with less fear (50% in PR). 
 
Research in the framing literature has shown that loss aversion diminishes risk aversion 
(Soman 2004; Thaler 1999). Thus, experienced entrepreneurs who show fewer tendencies toward 
NR generally perceive less loss or are less concerned about loss. In addition, entrepreneurship 
research shows that experience shapes a specific cognitive framework to tackle negative 
situations (Bhaduri and Worch 2008). Entrepreneurs often have more inclination toward 
cognitive and heuristic biases due to the ambiguity and uncertainty encompassing entrepreneurial 
activities. The significant difference between the framing effect in the negative area and less 
impressibility of experienced entrepreneurs stems from usage of the heuristic approach and bias 
between experience and inexperienced entrepreneurs. As learning is a necessary component in 
the entrepreneurial process, the best way to tackle losses in a business is learned by experienced 
entrepreneurs over time, and this leads to reduced loss aversion. The difference between NR and 
PR among experienced entrepreneurs is slight because they are equipped with idiosyncratic 
knowledge to take a calculated risk and have less conflict in making decisions. 
 
In the current competitive business environment, identifying framing problems is imperative. 
Depending on their specific conditions, external and internal environments of a firm can 
unconsciously form a specific frame of information or opportunities that may contain framing 
effects. An example of this was raised in our investment (money) scenario. With knowledge of 
these framings, sometimes investors, patent trolls, or patent intermediaries (Agrawal, 
Bhattacharya, and Hasija 2016) can try to force inexperienced entrepreneurs (or inventors) to act 
in favor of their interests, such as selling their patents or the technical knowledge of their 
products below market value. There is a substantial stream of research and examples on this 
issue in the intellectual property literature. While this threat exists, in the framing literature, 
“reframing” (Soman 2004; Thaler 1999) refers to the process by which individuals reformulate a 
decision scenario in a way that they are most comfortable with. In addition, training and giving 
advice to people in the reframing process could help reduce framing effects in judgments and 
decision-making (Druckman 2001). Improving their awareness of framing and cognitive bias 
problems could serve as a useful competitive advantage and a resource for entrepreneurial 
endeavors. Investigating the nature and quality of this idiosyncratic knowledge would be a 
promising topic for future research. 
 
General discussion 
 
This study attempted to scrutinize the behavior of entrepreneurs through two distinct studies. We 
examined entrepreneurs’ responses to decision anomalies and the impact on entrepreneurial 
judgment and decision-making. As entrepreneurs are more likely to face risks and uncertainty 
than other professionals, they need to be more careful about decision anomalies, including 
mental accounting and framing effects. That is, people’s attention can be framed such that it can 
even challenge their targeted and planned efforts. For example, people may ignore the slight 
differences between options, even though these options have a significant role; integrate the 
outcomes to increase the attractiveness of the options; give more weight to losses than wins; look 
for simple reasons at the time of selection; and compare the outcomes of the problem with the 
most available anchoring points. This could be a default or status quo situation. Study 1 showed 
that mental accounting bias has little impact on entrepreneurs' judgments. However, cognitive 
biases of sunk cost influenced their judgments. 
 
Cognitive limitations do not allow people to consider all the criteria. As noted, while some of 
these intuitions and biases are desirable and save time for processing complex and demanding 
tasks, they could be deemed risks if they put the situation out of reach and limit people’s control 
in the process. In Study 2, data on the risk framing effect comparing inexperienced and 
experienced entrepreneurs' decisions using an online survey revealed that experienced 
entrepreneurs’ judgments were less influenced by the framing effect while inexperienced 
entrepreneurs were more biased toward loss aversion. 
 
When making fundamental decisions such as choosing a technology, getting involved in strategic 
partnerships with others, or adopting a business model, entrepreneurs need to evaluate the 
conditions and information and trust their experiences and knowledge to avoid the effects of 
mental accounting and situation framing. For example, entrepreneurs need to determine if their 
decision is based on anchoring points or status quo biases or on opportunities and the demands of 
customers. Intuition becomes dangerous when entrepreneurs become certain of their mental 
values or rely on bias or over-confidence without considering the realities of an ecosystem. This 
might lead to opportunity loss and dissatisfaction. 
 
Implications 
 
For more than two decades the concept of mental accounting has been applied to many areas, 
including policy, economics, marketing, political sciences, and medicine. This research is a 
starting point for entrepreneurship research on decision anomalies. For example, future research 
could include specific topics related to entrepreneurship, such as opportunity recognition, teams, 
and innovation. Practical applications related to entrepreneurship education, such as mental 
accounting, could be included in a university entrepreneurship curriculum to improve students’ 
decision-making capabilities. Entrepreneurs can gain a competitive advantage by providing 
effective mental frames for attracting customers and making sound investments. In addition, by 
improving their skills in issues related to mental accounting, inexperienced entrepreneurs could 
become more aware and effective. 
 
Limitations and future research directions 
 
Research has shown that context and culture affect mental models (Willard and 
Norenzayan 2013). We carried out our research in Iran. Therefore, conducting similar studies in 
other contexts could provide further insights into this topic. Different degrees of risk and 
uncertainty or technological and environmental changes could be tested. Another question is 
what implications decision anomalies and cognitive biases may have for managerial settings, 
depending on decisions (El Shamy and Hassanein 2015) or the nature of information at hand 
(Caputo 2014; Zollo, Pellegrini, and Ciappei 2017). We challenged entrepreneurs' judgments and 
decision-making using mental accounting and the framing effect in this study, but the origins of 
these behaviors could be addressed in future research. For example, research could examine the 
sunk cost effect to determine the reason for the differences in decision-making between 
entrepreneurs and nonentrepreneurs. Moreover, research could investigate the difference 
between judgments by entrepreneurs and managers in terms of framing effects and mental 
accounting. Alternatively, what opportunities and threats are entrepreneurs likely to face when 
they are predisposed to certain types of cognitive biases or framing effects (eg goal framing vs. 
attribute framing; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1991; Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth 1998)? 
This study provides first evidence of how entrepreneurs develop judgments and make decisions 
when faced with decision anomalies. 
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Appendix 
 
Question 1 (task framing) 
 
“Imagine you intend to expand your business physically (eg you are manufacturing front 
suspension parts for heavy vehicles, and you are planning to manufacture tires or the like). If for 
this expansion you must choose between two business options (A and B), each with advantages 
and disadvantages, which one would you select?” 
 
Option A 
 
1. Proximity to target markets (suitable distance to target market) 
2. Low-cost human resources 
3. Fast and high return on investment 
4. Numerous opportunities to expand this business in the future 
5. Familiarity with this business 
6. Lack of specialized workforce in the target area 
7. High tax rate in this business 
8. Bad weather conditions (eg extreme storms, cold weather) 
9. Long distance between your place of residence and your business location 
10. High environmental variability, such as laws and regulations 
 
Option B 
 
1. Relatively acceptable distance with target markets 
2. Workforce with average wages 
3. Average return on investment 
4. Modest number of opportunities to expand the business in the future 
5. Relative familiarity with the business 
6. A modest rate of specialized workforce in the region 
7. Modest tax rate compared with other businesses 
8. Moderate weather conditions 
9. A relatively far distance between your place of residence and your business location 
10. Rules and regulations are relatively stable. 
 
Question 2 (endowment effect) 
 
“Imagine having bought a rug for personal use many years ago for 100 USD. Now you get an 
offer for that rug for 2,100 USD from the same vendor. Meanwhile, you have never paid more 
than 730 USD for a rug. How much are you willing to sell it for?” 
 
Absolutely reluctant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally willing 
 
Question 3 (sunk cost effect) 
 
Part 1 
 
“Suppose you have spent 4000 USD on a research project aimed to promote the brand image of 
your products in the minds of your customers. When the project reaches 90% of its completion, 
you find that the project will not be efficient with the changes that have taken place in the current 
market situation and there is the possibility of implementing a superior strategy to promote your 
brand, with less implementation costs. How much are you willing to continue to pay for the 
completion of the remaining 10% of the project?” 
 
Absolutely reluctant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally willing 
 
Part 2 
 
“You are offering a joint investment to a close friend to buy Company A’s shares. Your friend 
welcomes your suggestion. The shares are non-registered and transferable, but the purchase of 
shares has a time-limit and they are not returnable to Company A after being bought. You buy 
some shares for 1000 USD. Your friend notifies you after a week that he does not have cash now 
and asks you as his partner to buy shares for him and promises to return the amount in the near 
future. When buying the shares, you find out that for the same number of shares you must pay 
1100 USD. Relying on your friendship and after negotiating with him, you pay the amount. After 
10 days, your partner informs you that he has suffered heavy losses in his business and is not 
able to pay his debts and notifies you that he is unable to maintain this partnership. You 
desperately need your money, so you must surely sell your share to get that money. However, no 
one is willing to pay more than 830 USD. Which set of shares are you willing to sell?” 
 
Your share◻ 
Friend’s share◻ 
No difference◻ 
 
Question 4 (extra-cost effect) 
 
In the questionnaire P 
 
“Imagine you decide to see a show at a theater (regardless of your interest in the show) for a 3 
USD ticket. As soon as you enter the theater, you find that you have lost your 3 dollars. 
Although you have enough money, how much are you willing to pay another three USD for a 
ticket?” 
 
Absolutely reluctant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally willing 
 
In the questionnaire N 
 
“Imagine that you have decided to see a show at a theater (regardless of your interest in a 
particular show) for a 3 USD ticket. You buy the ticket beforehand. On the day of the show, you 
find that you have lost the ticket. Your place in the theater is not checked, so the ticket is not 
refundable. Although you have enough money, how much are you still willing to pay another 
three USD?” 
 
Absolutely reluctant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally willing 
 
Question 5 (integration and segregation of information) 
 
State 1 
 
“Imagine you want to buy a jacket and a calculator. You go to a shopping mall. The jacket is 25 
USD and the calculator is 3 USD. The salesperson tells you that in the other branch, which is 
about a 20-minute drive away, you could buy the same calculator for 2 USD. How much are you 
willing to go to the other branch?” 
 
Absolutely reluctant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally willing 
 
State 2 
 
“Imagine you want to buy a jacket and a calculator. You go to a shopping mall. The jacket is 3 
USD and the calculator is 25 USD. The salesperson tells you that in the other branch, which is 
about a 20-minute drive away, you could buy the same calculator for 24 USD. How much are 
you willing to go to the other branch?” 
 
Absolutely reluctant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally willing 
 
Question 6 (opportunity cost) 
 
“You can offer two products (A or B) to the market. Each would equally cost 2000 USD to 
produce and offer to the market. It is estimated that Product A will sell at 2300 USD, while 
Product B will sell at 2400 USD. A part of Product B is made from raw materials that you have 
in your warehouse, which if not used in production could be sold for 200 USD. If, due to 
material constraints, you can produce only one of the products, which one would you choose to 
produce?” 
